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 Abstract: Sabri Louatah’s Les Sauvages (2011-2016) joins an ongoing discussion 
over the French political class’s relationship with the racial and religious divides in 
contemporary French society. Louatah portrays the political class as imposing from above a 
divide between French descendants of Muslim immigrants and their majority culture 
compatriots, and suggests that the functioning of the modern state makes this necessary: 
states are founded upon communities of belonging which require the exclusion of given 
minorities, and will reimpose that exclusion with force if a more inclusive model of 
community threatens to emerge. Two readings of how Les Sauvages suggests we should 
respond to this are possible. One suggests that subjects should reject the state entirely, 
seeking to form inclusive communities escaping its control. Another suggests that the 
structures of the modern state should be appropriated to promote inclusion, but that the nature 
of modern democracy will prevent such action from succeeding completely; as such, 
traditional political engagement must work in conjunction with more radical attempts to form 
communities free from exclusion. Both readings, however, hold in common the idea that 
racial and religious divides are imposed from above and that these divides cannot be 
completely overcome while working within mainstream political structures. 
Keywords: French Islam, Islamophobia, Political Fiction, Les Sauvages, Louatah. 
Main Text 
The idea that a political ‘elite’ is imposing its wishes upon society, and particularly in 
matters relating to immigration, integration, and Islam, is commonplace in French political 
discourse. Its association with far-right populism was neatly demonstrated when Front 
national (FN) general secretary Nicolas Bay claimed that Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 
American Presidential election represented ‘la victoire du peuple contre ses élites’ 
(@nicolasbayfn, 8 November 2016). The far right typically accuses these elites of enabling 
Muslims to undermine the secular Republic, usually blaming their incompetence or blindness 
to the putative Muslim threat. Some polemicists, however, accuse them of having more 
sinister motives: Renaud Camus claims that the political class are deliberately allowing what 
he labels the ‘grand remplacement’ of France's people and society with an Islamic alternative 
(Camus 2011, 41, 50-51, 103-104). 
Not only the far right, however, criticises ‘elites’ for their role in structuring debates 
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surrounding racial and religious divides in contemporary France; academics and anti-racism 
campaigners accuse them of imposing political and media discourses which stigmatise 
postcolonial immigrants and their descendants, assumed to be Muslim, as a threat to the 
nation. Thomas Deltombe (2007) claims that this started as early as the late 1970s, arguing 
that the problematisation of Islam serves to cloak anti-Arab racism in the more ostensibly 
‘respectable’ language of religious critique. Recent Islamist terrorist attacks in the West have 
allowed Muslims to be further stigmatised en masse as potential terrorists: the treatment of 
them as guilty until proven innocent is exemplified in mayor of Bordeaux Alain Juppé's claim 
after the Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015 that French Muslims ‘doivent dire 
clairement qu’ils n’ont rien à voir avec [...] l’ État islamique' (@alainjuppe, 16 November 
2015). 
Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed argue that various factors have motivated 
politicians and media outlets to stigmatise Muslims, or those perceived as Muslim, in this 
way. As differences between left and right wing economic programmes have lessened, social 
issues have become increasingly important political battlegrounds; the common acceptance 
that there is a ‘problème musulman’ has provided such a battleground, allowing left and right 
to differentiate themselves by offering differing solutions to it. The FN’s rising popularity has 
also led mainstream parties to embrace anti-Muslim rhetoric in the hope of attracting far right 
voters. Equally, since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and particularly since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, 2001, sensationalist coverage of stories relating to a supposed 
Muslim threat has become increasingly profitable to media outlets. (Hajjat and Mohammed 
2016, 108-109, 116-119, 121, 131-133, 285-287). Unlike Camus, Hajjat and Mohammed thus 
do not suggest that an ‘elite’ conspiracy is at work; multiple structural factors, they argue, 
have encouraged the stigmatisation of Islam and Muslims. Nonetheless, both schools of 
thought are united by the belief that discourses surrounding Islam in France are imposed from 
above by an ‘elite’ more concerned with maintaining their own privileged status than the 
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interests of the French people (Muslim or otherwise). 
 Michel Houellebecq’s Soumission is the best-known recent literary expression of the 
pervasive dissatisfaction with this ‘elite’. As Adam Gopnik notes, Houellebecq’s novel 
attacks ‘the spinelessness of the French intellectual class’, which allows political Islam to be 
imposed on France in return for assurances that it will maintain its own privileged position 
thereafter (Gopnik 2015). While this article will not join the debate over whether Soumission 
should be considered Islamophobic, Houellebecq’s portrayal of France’s political class shares 
some common features with that of Camus. Although Houellebecq’s political elite does not 
actively support the ‘Islamisation’ of France, its decision to form a coalition with Mohammed 
Ben Abbes’s Fraternité musulmane, which subsequently wins the presidential election of 
2022, is what allows it to happen (Houellebecq 2015, 75-77 83-84, 150). 
Another recent text, however, has used similar subject matter to give the opposite 
representation of France’s political class. Sabri Louatah’s tetralogy Les Sauvages (2011-2016) 
also depicts the nation electing a President of North African descent. Where Ben Abbes leads 
an Islamist party, however, in Louatah’s work Idder Chaouch wins the 2012 presidential 
election as leader of the Parti socialiste (PS); far from seeking to impose political Islam like 
Ben Abbes, he is not even a practising Muslim. Louatah’s tetralogy draws upon the 
conventions of several genres to depict the election and its aftermath, notably incorporating 
elements of the Balzacien family saga and political thriller. Louatah describes Les Sauvages 
as a ‘roman feuilleton en quatre volumes’, also inspired by the American TV series which he 
considers the novels of the twenty-first century; the influence of these genres is particularly 
apparent in his use of short, fast-paced chapters ending in cliff-hangers to deliver a story in 
which the kind of government plot most closely associated with the political thriller is 
gradually uncovered (Cavigliogi 2013; Louatah 2015). 
 This article will explore how Louatah’s depiction of the French ‘elite’ resonates with 
that of Hajjat and Mohammed. It will subsequently draw upon Leela Gandhi’s theoretical 
4 
 
framework of the ‘politics of friendship’ to provide two different readings of how Les 
Sauvages may suggest to its readers France’s racial and religious divides could be bridged. 
First, however a definition of how the term ‘elite’ should be understood in this article 
will be necessary. Within political discourse it is typically poorly defined, signifying all 
which conspires to manipulate society in its own interests and against those of the people 
(another vague term which it will not be necessary to explore here). The ‘elite’ is typically 
connected with the political class, the so-called ‘mainstream media’, and the world of 
finance, and is held to be at the heart of an equally vaguely defined ‘system’. These terms can 
be applied so broadly that in the 2017 French Presidential elections, candidates as different as 
Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, and even former Prime Minister 
François Fillon all presented themselves as ‘antisystème’ (Ory 2016; Bouchet-Petersen 2017). 
The centrality of the term to contemporary political debate in France and elsewhere speaks to 
a pervasive dissatisfaction with the current situation, which politicians of all stripes seek to 
harness by presenting themselves as outsiders challenging a self-serving establishment. 
An in-depth analysis of the different uses to which the term ‘elite’ is put would fall 
outside the scope of this article; here, it will denote members of the political class and the 
journalists normally assumed to be complicit in their manoeuvres. This broad definition is 
shared by most of those who complain about ‘elite’ influence, with disagreement arising over 
which news outlets and sections of the political spectrum should be included. Politicians 
implicate their opponents; polemicists like Camus claim that both the mainstream right and 
left are complicit in allowing France to be ‘Islamised’; Hajjat and Mohammed conversely 
argue that politicians and media outlets from across the political spectrum are complicit in 
stigmatising Muslims. 
 Les Sauvages’s depiction of the elite is closest to the latter although, unlike Hajjat and 
Mohammed and in keeping with his adoption of the tropes of the political thriller, Louatah 
does depict an organised conspiracy. On election day Chaouch is shot by Abdelkrim or Krim 
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Nerrouche, a young man of Algerian descent from the town of Saint-Étienne. Krim has been 
manipulated into carrying out the attack by his elder cousin, Nazir, but the conspiracy goes 
far deeper. Nazir was in the pay of conspirators led by Pierre-Jean de Montesquiou, principal 
private secretary to incumbent Interior Minister Marie-France Vermorel, who had previously 
employed him to manipulate alienated young men of North African descent into planning 
jihadist attacks. Before they could act they would be arrested on terrorism charges, allowing 
Montesquiou and co-conspirators working in law enforcement to both reap the benefits of 
their apparent efficiency and scapegoat Muslims as a threat to public security. Unwilling to 
allow Chaouch to become President, Montesquiou turns to Nazir to find a young man willing 
to assassinate the Socialist candidate; Nazir chooses his cousin (Louatah 2011, 239; 2016, 
300-305). 
He cannot interest Krim in radical Islam, instead exploiting the alienation of this 
young man from Saint-Étienne’s deprived outskirts led into petty crime after an early 
abandonment by his teachers left him unqualified and unable to find fulfilling employment. 
In particular he persuades Krim to attack the new President by encouraging him to blame the 
French state for the death of his father, a factory worker killed by the toxic fumes he inhaled 
while working. Although Nazir’s own motivations are less clear, he too privately uses the 
language of class more than that of religion; when riots erupt in banlieues nationwide after 
the attack on Chaouch, he boasts that he has incited ‘les classes maudites’ to ‘honorer leur 
rage’. When he does appeal to radical Islam, it is only as a means of manipulating others; his 
brother, Fouad, even claims that Nazir has never had ‘une seule pensée religieuse de toute sa 
vie’ (Louatah 2011, 16-18; 2013, 190-191, 462-463; 2016, 306-307). 
Montesquiou and his cronies, however, ensure that early media coverage of the attack 
assumes that it was an act of Islamist terrorism. Co-conspirator Xavier Putéoli, editor of news 
website Avernus.fr, plays a central role in promoting this narrative. Soon after the attack, 
Montesquiou feeds him a video of innocent relatives of Krim and Nazir being arrested for 
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questioning; he quickly publishes it on his website, suggesting that the whole family may be a 
terrorist cell. The subsequent arrest of several acquaintances of Nazir is characterised as a 
‘coup de filet antiterroriste’, by the media, which underlines that some of them are ‘liés à 
l’islamisme radical’. Despite a lack of evidence implicating any of Krim or Nazir’s relatives 
in the attack, one conspirator adds in a radio interview that those arrested may be linked to 
the ‘réseau Nerrouche’. This accumulation of media coverage allows Vermorel to quickly 
move from claiming that ‘aucune piste [n’est] exclue’ in determining Nazir’s motivations to 
stigmatising Islam as a ‘ferment de décomposition nationale’. Populations of postcolonial 
immigrant descent, assumed to be Muslim, in general find themselves stigmatised by 
association: Putéoli claims that the putative unmasking of the Nerrouche family, whom 
neighbours thought were ‘une famille sans histoires’, as a terrorist cell demonstrates ‘l’échec 
de l’“intégration”’ (Louatah 2012, 372-373, 388-389; 2013, 265, 328-329, 332-333, 558). 
  Louatah’s depiction of political and media ‘elites’ manipulating coverage of this 
attack, which is not religiously motivated, to promote the narrative that France has a 
‘problème musulman’ resonates with Hajjat and Mohammed’s thesis. Why, though, are the 
conspirators so determined to ensure that Chaouch cannot become President? Although 
Montesquiou’s personal racism plays a role, it is less important than Chaouch’s desire to 
bridge the racial and religious divides in French society. He gives hope to marginalised young 
people of postcolonial immigrant descent that they can succeed in France: as Fouad 
Nerrouche puts it, when ‘les gamins de la banlieue’ see Chaouch they will finally be able to 
say that ‘[u]n type qui me ressemble peut devenir président […] de tous les Français’. His 
uncle Toufik makes explicit that this is a desire for inclusion rather than mere personal 
success by saying that Chaouch will ‘réuni[r] les Français au lieu de les diviser’. Tens of 
thousands of descendants of immigrants living in France’s ‘banlieues à problèmes’ are 
inspired by this prospect, with many registering to vote for the first time in order to support 
Chaouch. The wish for unity, however, is not confined to these populations. Chaouch wins an 
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election recording 89.4% participation, with so many young people voting for him that they 
are dubbed ‘génération Chaouch’. Working class communities also seem inspired by his 
message: commentators note that they have abandoned extremist candidates to vote for him 
(Louatah 2011, 89, 153-154; 2012, 310-311, 458-459; 2016, 159). 
 Chaouch also seeks to reduce the chasm between the French populace and its 
politicians, refusing to manipulate the electorate into supporting him through the kind of 
tactics used by Montesquiou and Putéoli. He disregards numerous warnings from his advisors 
that elections cannot be won ‘en faisant confiance au bon sens des électeurs’, instead placing 
his trust in voters’ goodwill even when public opinion takes a sharp anti-Muslim turn after 
the failed assassination. Shortly after leaving intensive care he insists that Fouad Nerrouche, 
who is romantically involved with his daughter Jasmine, accompany his party to a G8 
meeting in New York. He disregards an advisor’s warning that showing such favour to the 
brother of public enemy number one Nazir will be electoral suicide ahead of the legislative 
elections which follow their presidential counterpart, replying that ‘[l]es Français sauront 
reconnaître le geste d’un père, le geste d’un homme envers un autre homme’. His wish to 
establish a relationship with the electorate based on mutual respect rather than deception is 
demonstrated by the fact that, in his previous role as mayor of the fictional town of Grogny, 
he knew the names of ‘tous les gamins du quartier’ (Louatah 2013, 52-53, 505-506, 557-558). 
 His attempt to reduce the distance separating the political class from those they 
represent is not only resisted by his right-wing opponents; rivals within the PS are also 
involved in Montesquiou’s conspiracy. Their treachery is partly motivated by the fact that, to 
implement his project, Chaouch introduces a new generation of candidates for the legislative 
elections, leaving many ‘vieux mâles blancs, des privilégiés de la politique, des barons 
locaux’ divested of their previous influence. It is the entire political elite – from which ethnic 
minorities, women, and the young, are largely excluded – that Chaouch threatens (Louatah 
2013, 445-446; 2016, 287-288). That both left and right-wing politicians are willing to 
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stigmatise a whole community to protect their own privileged status resonates strongly with 
Hajjat and Mohammed’s argument. 
More than their personal privileges, however, are threatened: Chaouch’s desire to 
reduce social, racial, and religious divides undermines the very foundations of the modern 
state. As Giorgio Agamben argues, ‘The state [...] is not founded on a social bond of which it 
would be the expression, but rather on the dissolution, the unbinding it prohibits’. The 
inclusion of those who meet the conditions of belonging that it imposes is thus less important 
than the exclusion of those who do not (Agamben 1993, 86). Chaouch seeks to unite the 
national community, ending exclusion; it is the state itself that is threatened by this project, 
and not just its political elites. 
 Leela Gandhi holds that what Jacques Derrida labels the ‘politics of friendship’ can 
help us to overcome the exclusion inherent in the modern state. Derrida notes that Western 
political systems are typically based upon 
quelque adhérence de l’État à la famille [...] une schématique de la filiation: la souche, 
le genre ou l’espèce, le sexe (Geschlecht), le sang, la naissance, la nature, la nation 
(Derrida 1994, 12-13). 
The focus upon similarity, and thus exclusion of what is deemed different, in this 
characterisation of the modern state echoes Agamben’s; the insight that it draws upon a 
schematic of filiation enables us to ask what other framework may enable more inclusive 
communities (Gandhi 2006, 9-10). 
 This is where friendship offers some hope, signifying all that rejects this injunction to 
similarity and allows radically different singularities to connect with each other on an 
affective level. One’s family is necessarily similar to oneself; the same need not be true of 
one’s friends. A community founded upon friendship rather than filiation could be open and 
hospitable, welcoming difference rather than fearing it. Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of com-
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parution, Gandhi suggests, can help elucidate how we might establish such a community. 
Com-parution rejects all pre-imposed identities; it is only through our contact with the Other 
that the self can exist (Gandhi 2006, 19-20). As Nancy puts it: 
l’ordre de la com-parution est plus originaire que celui du lien.  Elle ne s’instaure pas, 
elle ne s’établit pas, ou n’émerge pas entre des sujets (objets) déjà donnés.  Elle 
consiste dans la parution de l’entre comme tel: toi et moi (l’entre-nous), formule dans 
laquelle le et n’a pas valeur de juxtaposition, mais d’exposition.  Dans la com-
parution se trouve exposé ceci, qu’il faut savoir lire selon toutes les combinaisons 
possibles: "toi (e(s)t) (tout autre que) moi".  Ou encore, plus simplement: toi partage 
moi (Nancy 2004, 74). 
There can be no self without Other because it is on the boundary between the two, in 
touching the Other, that the self is exposed. Com-parution, then, necessitates an ability to 
constantly expropriate the self into the space between self and other; there can be no self-
contained subject, no pre-imposed identity, and no community of resemblance. This is 
anathema to the modern state: it must therefore be violently repressed whenever it threatens 
to appear, with shared spaces in which singularities might come into contact needing to be 
tightly controlled. 
Chaouch’s intentions are far from as radical as Gandhi’s, but his wish to overcome 
racial and religious divisions remains intolerable to the modern state and for that reason it 
must respond. Elite manipulation of the media should be read in this context; the internet, a 
shared space which in principle provides new virtual spaces of anti-identitarian and 
democratic potential, is particularly important. As Sara Ahmed notes, online spaces like 
messageboards can facilitate the creation of communities (Ahmed 2004, 95-96). It is far from 
inevitable that these communities will, without outside intervention, come to resemble 
communities of friendship: countless real-life examples of trolling attest to this, while in Les 
Sauvages numerous anti-Semitic conspiracy theories emerge online regarding the attack on 
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Chaouch. Nazir also uses social media to incite young people to violence, echoing the 
successful online recruitment strategies of real-world terrorist organisations (Louatah 2012, 
484-485; 2016, 81-82). Nonetheless, the possibility that communities escaping its control 
might emerge in this shared space necessitates intervention from the state. 
 The use of online news coverage to scapegoat the Nerrouche family is one example of 
such intervention. As Derrida notes, ‘‘l’intrusion en permanence [...] de l’autre’ into one’s 
home through the television (and, presumably, computer) screen can be experienced as an 
invasion. Particularly when that Other is portrayed as a threat, this often leads to a reaction of 
violent rejection (Derrida & Dufourmantelle 1997, 83). This is why it is critically important 
that the scapegoating of the Nerrouche family begins with the nationwide diffusion, via 
Putéoli’s website, of the video of their arrest. The family, against their will, invade their 
compatriots’ homes in the form of a threatening, potentially terrorist Other, inciting a 
response of fear and rejection aimed at all who resemble them. Thus, when Vermorel and 
Putéoli go on to explicitly extrapolate the suspicion of terrorism to post-immigrant 
communities as a whole, public opinion seems to follow: there is little complaint when 
soldiers guarding the Parisian metro against potential terrorist attacks systematically search 
‘tous les passagers à peau bistre’ (Louatah 2012, 521; 2013, 30-31). 
 The Nerrouche family’s neighbours’ description of them in televised interviews as 
‘une famille sans histoires’ also helps enable this, and Ahmed’s work can help us understand 
how. Analysing speeches made in 2000 by then British Conservative leader William Hague, 
in which he claimed that Britain risked being ‘swamped’ by ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, she 
notes that ostensibly Hague differentiated these ‘bogus’ new arrivals from those who were 
‘genuine’. By doing so he allowed his supporters to continue considering themselves 
hospitable towards the ‘genuine’ while opening the structural possibility that any could be 
bogus. Given the difficulty of differentiating between the two, in practice this validated the 
pre-emptive rejection of all asylum seekers as potentially bogus. The unveiling of the 
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Nerrouche family as a terrorist cell follows a similar logic, suggesting that any ‘famille sans 
histoires’ could potentially be terrorists. As Ahmed also notes, however, the fear of terrorism 
has since 2001 not been attached to all bodies equally, but to certain ones in particular: those 
which ‘appear “Middle Eastern, Arab or Muslim”’ (Ahmed 2004, 46-48, 75-77). Not all 
apparently unassuming families fall under suspicion; only those considered to look Muslim. 
In contemporary France this means postcolonial immigrants and their descendants, and 
particularly those of Maghrebi descent. Vermorel understands this and exploits it to call their 
very Frenchness into question when she characterises the riots which erupt in banlieues 
nationwide following the attack on Chaouch as ‘intolérables pour nos concitoyens’ (Louatah 
2013, 133-134). As Ahmed notes, those who suggest how ‘we’ should respond to a given 
event generate what ‘we’ means; here, Vermorel constructs citizenship around finding the 
riots intolerable (Ahmed 2004, 98-99). Given that they broke out in banlieues associated in 
the popular imagination with racial alterity, among those angered by the attack on the so-
called ‘candidat arabe’, this speech act is a challenge to the legitimacy of post-immigrant 
communities. Postcolonial immigrants and their descendants thus become both potential 
terrorists and at best problematically French: divides that Chaouch had sought to bridge have 
been re-imposed, using the shared space of televised and online news coverage. 
The conspirators’ use of the internet for this purpose also exploits a threat to the very 
notion of hospitality which is inherent in the medium. As Derrida notes, in order for 
hospitality to exist the boundary between the public and private spaces must be theoretically 
inviolable; when the frontiers of the home become permeable the host loses their sovereignty 
over whom they invite in, which is a necessary precondition of hospitality. The state’s ability 
to censor online communications compromises the boundaries of the home in this way: when 
it intercepts messages sent between two homes and intended to be private, it introduces itself 
uninvited into both. This is problematic because ‘[p]artout où le “chez soi” est violé [...] on 
peut prévoir une réaction privatisante, voire familialiste, voire […] ethnocentrique et 
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nationaliste, et donc virtuellement xénophobe’ (Derrida & Dufourmantelle 1997, 51). This is 
demonstrated in Les Sauvages when, with widespread state surveillance taken for granted by 
protagonists, the release of the video of the Nerrouche family being arrested by agents of the 
state in their own home dramatises the state’s ability to undermine the boundaries of any 
home: that the video is released online underlines this by allowing uninvited spectators into 
the Nerrouche household, bringing the Nerrouche family uninvited into theirs, and reminding 
them that the physical intrusion of police officers is not the only means by which the state can 
enter their home. As Derrida predicts, the video thus helps provoke a xenophobic reaction not 
against the state but those often characterised in racist discourses as uninvited guests in the 
nation: once again, those who appear ‘Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim’. 
 This chain of events begins with the attack on Chaouch, whose status as a presidential 
candidate allows it to be portrayed as an attack against France itself. The strength of the 
process of racial othering that it triggers is demonstrated when even his own Frenchness is 
soon able to be called into question. Upon reawakening from the coma into which the attack 
sends him, the multilingual President speaks in Chinese before French; upon discovering this, 
Putéoli publishes the story but emphasises his racial alterity by substituting Chinese for 
Arabic. The conspirators subsequently portray the far from devout Chaouch as part of the 
putative Muslim problem when, after having left hospital, he refuses a jambon-beurre 
sandwich during a public engagement. His unwillingness to eat this pork-based French 
speciality, they claim, demonstrates a Muslim refusal to 'intégrer'; Montesquiou subsequently 
denounces Chaouch’s government as ‘islamo-gauchiste’, claiming immediately after that 
France is under attack from Islamism. Chaouch, paradoxically, now represents both the 
wounded national body and its perceived Islamist attacker (Louatah 2012, 616; 2013, 209; 
2016, 78-79, 193). This demonstrates what Ahmed terms the ‘stickiness’ of the stereotype of 
the Arab-as-terrorist; any body perceived as ‘Arab’, even one which is itself a victim of 
violence presented as terrorist, can fall under suspicion of terrorism (Ahmed 2004, 59-60, 76-
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77, 98-99).i 
 Amid this climate of hysteria politicians from the right of the mainstream right, led by 
Vermorel and Montesquiou, form an alliance with the FN. The Alliance des Droites 
Nationales (ADN) seeks to invalidate the election of Chaouch, ostensibly because his 
physical and mental condition after the attack leaves him incapable of leading the nation. 
What they are really challenging, of course, is the legitimacy of this son of Algerian 
immigrants to be President of France: they hope to unite the nation around an opposition to 
the fictitious threat that they have generated, expressed in the rejection of Chaouch. The 
effectiveness of these tactics is demonstrated even before the ADN is formed, when the FN’s 
new membership rates rise by 1000% following the attack; after it is created, polls show an 
immediate spike in support for the movement (Louatah 2013, 346-347, 479-489). 
 The ADN’s popularity is not the only way in which the success of the conspirators in 
re-imposing racial and religious divides in French society makes itself clear. The banlieue 
riots demonstrate the anger of some descendants of immigrants; although most conspiracy 
theories which subsequently emerge implicate former President Nicolas Sarkozy in the 
attack, others are openly anti-Semitic. Their anger at the attack on Chaouch has led some 
descendants of Muslim immigrants to re-assert two of contemporary France’s divides: one 
between themselves and a political class seen as intrinsically racist, and another with a Jewish 
community which a minority of them stigmatises en masse as complicit in a Zionist 
conspiracy to oppress Muslims. This xenophobic reaction is mirrored by Islamophobic 
incidents among the Franco-French community: Muslim quarters of graveyards nationwide 
are vandalised and, after the jambon-beurre incident, many people gleefully follow Putéoli’s 
suggestion to leave ham sandwiches on the doorsteps of their Muslim neighbours in a ‘Nuit 
des Jambon-beurres’. The rise in anti-Muslim discrimination culminates when neo-Nazis kill 
thirty-six people in an attack on a Saint- Étienne mosque; the victims include journalists 
suspected by the attackers of being Jewish, underlining that anti-Semitism in contemporary 
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France is not, as is often implied, exclusively a Muslim problem (Louatah 2016, 81, 127-128, 
164-167, 188-189, 225-227, 266-267, 272-273; Marelli 2006, 138-140). 
 Louatah’s political elites interfere not only in spaces shared by all of society but also 
those like letters, social media messages, and phonecalls through which singular subjects seek 
to connect with each other. Bernard Stiegler characterises any letter as ‘un envoi au loin de 
soi qui rompt déjà le cercle de toute proximité’ (Derrida & Stiegler 1996, 45). Derrida agrees, 
holding that ‘je te touche en t’envoyant quoi que ce soit, même si ce n’est rien’; social media 
messages surely hold similar potential. Derrida adds that telephone calls also offer an 
opportunity to touch one’s interlocutor, holding that ‘en parlant [...] nous nous touchons 
encore en mêlant nos voix’ (Derrida 1980, 63-64, 88). This idea of touching is central to 
Nancy’s conception of community: it is precisely when we touch the Other that com-parution 
can emerge, and Stiegler’s ‘envoi au loin de soi’ is the type of self-expropriation needed to 
make this possible. 
Montesquiou and his co-conspirators repeatedly seek to prevent protagonists from 
appropriating these spaces to form intersubjective connections. Krim’s only point of contact 
with white, bourgeois France is Aurélie Wagner, whom he met on holiday the year before the 
events depicted in Les Sauvages and with whom he is besotted. Although too shy to contact 
her for some time thereafter, before the attack he arranges via FacebookTM messages to meet 
her in Paris. He seems willing to renounce the assassination in order to be with Aurélie, and 
only after her affluent friends humiliate him does he carry it out. After his arrest Aurélie, 
hoping to make amends, writes a letter to him which she hopes to persuade her father, the 
judge heading the investigation of the attack, to pass on. However, the elite intervenes: 
Putéoli’s son, who is her classmate, steals the letter and it soon reaches Montesquiou. 
Montesquiou subsequently offers sections of it to Krim in return for information about Nazir, 
who has escaped his control. The elite conspirators not only prevent Krim and Aurélie from 
connecting with one another across social and racial divides, using a letter as they had 
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previously used social media; they appropriate Aurélie’s attempt to do so and use it to force 
Krim into a relationship of still greater dependency upon them. (Louatah 2011, 148, 166, 187, 
225-228, 231; 2012, 512-513, 581-582, 629) 
 The plotters sabotage the relationship between Jasmine Chaouch and Fouad 
Nerrouche in similar fashion. They intercept Fouad’s phonecalls and messages to Jasmine, 
leaving her wondering why he is not contacting her; she is dissuaded from contacting him by 
advisors who encourage her to consider him suspect by association with his brother and 
cousin. Fouad overcomes this block on relationality by writing her a letter, which manages to 
sidestep state surveillance; in their subsequent telephone conversation the narratorial voice 
collapses the distance between them, immediately following Fouad’s ‘Jasmine?’ with ‘Les 
larmes montèrent aux yeux de la jeune femme’. Their connection has been re-established and 
its effect is as physical as Derrida implies when he holds that his telephonic interlocutor ‘me 
touche, me prend dans sa voix’. The power of the in-between space of the phone call is 
further underlined later, even as their relationship flounders; when Jasmine telephones Fouad 
her voice, although weak, holds ‘comme un pont de cordes au-dessus d’un ravin brumeux’. 
Their relationship similarly functions as a bridge across both social and religious divides: 
while both are of Kabylian descent, Fouad originates from the banlieues of Saint- Étienne 
while Jasmine grew up in ‘les beaux quartiers’ of Paris, and her heritage is both culturally 
Muslim on her father’s side and Jewish on her mother’s. The hope of reconciliation that their 
relationship represents is demonstrated when Jasmine becomes pregnant; they agree that ‘[l]a 
vie, ça se dit Chaim en hébreu, et Hayat en arabe [...] Si c’est un garçon, on l’appelle Chaim. 
Si c’est une fille, on l’appelle Hayat.’ The state’s interference, however, eventually 
overcomes them: Fouad’s resentment at the treatment of his family along with the doubts 
concerning his motivations that Jasmine’s entourage have planted in her mind lead her to end 
their relationship, planning on terminating her pregnancy (Louatah 2012, 325, 402, 431-432, 
447-448, 600-601; 2013, 102-103; 2016, 63-64, 190-191; Derrida 1980, 63-64). 
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 The success of Montesquiou and his cronies in re-imposing divides which had seemed 
to be disappearing is shown through Krim’s fifteen-year-old sister, Luna. Before the attack, 
Luna is the Nerrouche family member who seems to feel most unproblematically French: she 
is likely to soon be selected by the national junior gymnastics team, and takes pride in the 
prospect of representing France. Her FacebookTM account is filled with pictures of her with 
friends whose names are conspicuously Franco-French, and to whom she refers as ‘soeurs’. 
Luna’s realisation that she is at best conditionally accepted as French is, therefore, all the 
more painful. After the attack, neither her gymnastics coaches nor her friends will reply when 
she tries to contact them via social media; this previously inclusive shared space has become 
the site of her exclusion, and she angrily reacts by deleting ‘tous ses amis Facebook dont les 
noms ne sonnaient pas musulman’. Then, having previously blamed Islam for Krim’s 
wrongdoing, she substitutes the French identity of which she feels divested for a contestatory 
Islamic replacement. This is symbolised in her decision to wear a veil, the signifier par 
excellence of Muslim alterity within French political discourse, having previously dressed in 
a fashion that Krim considered too provocative.ii  The stigmatisation of descendants of North 
African immigrants as un-French on the basis of their perceived Muslim identity thus 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Luna only ceases to feel French when it becomes clear to 
her that she is not accepted as such; she latches on to a contestatory Muslim identity not 
because of any inherent religious opposition to mainstream culture, but because it is as an 
assumed Muslim that she has been rejected. That she adopts this identity primarily due to her 
consciousness of exclusion is demonstrated when youths leave a ham sandwich on her 
family’s doorstep during Putéoli’s ‘Nuit des jambons beurres’; Luna seizes the chance to fight 
back against discrimination that this provocation offers, jettisoning her veil as she runs to 
fight the youths (Louatah 2011, 44-45, 182-83, 223; 2016, 121-122,  126-127, 226-227). 
Power thus works to prevent social divides from being bridged both on the national 
level and between individuals, and has considerable success in both domains. This portrayal 
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of the modern state as reliant upon exclusion fits Agamben’s framework; its depiction of the 
French political and media ‘elite’ imposing racial and religious divisions upon the people also 
resonates with Hajjat and Mohammed’s thesis, even if it depicts an organised conspiracy 
rather than their convergence of structural factors. 
Les Sauvages ends, however, more positively: the French public rally around 
Chaouch’s message of hope that the nation can be united, rejecting the ADN. Montesquiou 
and several co-conspirators are brought to justice, but Chaouch’s party remains comfortably 
ahead of theirs in opinion polls even beforehand. Chaouch prevents them from re-imposing 
racial and religious divides as successfully as initially appeared to be the case, and does so 
precisely by refusing to replicate their tactics. He is unwilling to follow an advisor’s 
suggestion that he respond to the jambon-beurre incident by publicly stating that he is not 
Muslim after Fouad argues that this would only validate the idea that it would be a problem if 
he was; Fouad believes that ‘l’écrasante majorité’ of young French people of all backgrounds 
share his belief that it would not. It is significant that this advice comes from the actor Fouad 
rather than Chaouch’s professional advisors. They do not intend to stigmatise Muslims, but 
feel that Chaouch can succeed only by reassuring the public that he is not one of them: the 
discourse of the ‘problème musulman’ has become so pervasive that individuals used to 
working within politics can only think of communication strategies which accept that such a 
problem exists. It takes an outsider to realise that what Chaouch must do is repudiate this 
basic premise. Les Sauvages thus attacks the inability of contemporary French politicians, 
whether they are personally Islamophobes or not, to treat Islam as anything other than a 
problem; it suggests that the only way to combat the likes of Montesquiou is to step outside 
of the discourse of the ‘problème musulman’ altogether (Louatah 2016, 103-104, 112-113, 
117, 288-290). 
 Further hope is provided by the fact that not everyone within the state apparatus or 
media is corrupt: Aurélie’s father Judge Wagner, Commandant Mansourd of the Direction 
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centrale du renseignement intérieur, and the investigative journalist Marieke van 
Vanderdroom all work tirelessly to expose Montesquiou’s plot. State hegemony is also not 
complete: this is symbolised when Aurélie, visiting her father’s office while Krim is being 
interviewed in an adjoining room, darts past his guards and shouts that she loves him; even if 
only for a second, she has managed to bypass the state apparatus keeping them apart. How 
beneficial even such fleeting moments of connection can be is shown by the regenerating 
effect that hearing Aurélie has on Krim; he leaves the interview with a smile on his face, 
having previously sat in sullen silence (Louatah 2016, 212-213). 
Fouad and Jasmine, meanwhile, remain separated at the end of the text, but are at least 
reconciled after a stormy separation. Jasmine decides not to have an abortion, and will allow 
Fouad contact with their child. The child, whose name will mean ‘life’, will thus remain a 
bridge across the social divides separating Fouad, Jasmine, and their respective families 
(Louatah 2016, 278-279, 308-309). An unborn child, named ‘Life’, is a powerful symbol of 
hope for the future. The parental love which Fouad and Jasmine will, one would expect, feel 
for their offspring may be the closest thing to com-parution in Les Sauvages. Their child will 
in some sense be a bridge between them: like com-parution, their love will thus be exposed 
on the boundary between self and other. Love seems eminently compatible with com-
parution; Alain Badiou sees love as  
le laborieux devenir d’une vérité construite point par point [...] un travail [...] et non 
pas seulement un miracle. Il faut être sur la brèche, il faut prendre garde, il faut se 
réunir, avec soi-même et avec l’autre (Badiou & Truong 2009, 83-84). 
This has much in common with com-parution’s constant exposition of the self through 
contact with the other, and while it may be easy for Fouad and Jasmine to love their own 
child the point is broader. The formation of a community of friendship necessitates love, not 
for the Other as such but for the contact we have with all that is different. 
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 The tetralogy’s most powerful moment of reconciliation comes after the attack on the 
Saint-Étienne mosque, when people of all ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds come 
together across the nation to commemorate the dead. The atmosphere of the marches is 
utopian: strangers offer support to the elderly Ferhat Nerrouche, while Fouad and Nazir’s 
brother Slimane, who previously tried to hide his homosexuality, walks arm in arm with his 
boyfriend: a Syrian refugee. Louatah portrays the French political class negatively, but not 
the French people: although susceptible to elite manipulation, most wish for their divided 
society to be reunited. Les Sauvages suggests that this outcome is achievable if they reject the 
discourses of exclusion imposed upon them, against their will, from above (Louatah  2016, 
213-214, 288-290, 318-320). 
While the text thus seems to suggest that its readers should distrust the existing 
political class, this seems undermined by the fact that the nation needs Chaouch himself in 
order to be reconciled. Only through his influence can the agents of the state who seek to 
expose Montesquiou’s conspiracy succeed, with Mansourd and Wagner both distanced from 
the investigation until he intervenes (Louatah 2016, 69-70). Equally, it is Chaouch’s 
programme that people rally around and Chaouch who has the courage to reject the discourse 
of the ‘problème musulman’. If Les Sauvages implies that the French people must reject their 
nation’s exclusive community of belonging, equally it seems to suggest that such efforts need 
the help of some political homme providentiel. 
This is problematic because, despite his wish to overcome the divides that his 
predecessors have imposed, Chaouch does not seek to alter the way in which the state itself 
functions. Soon after the election he evokes the need for pragmatism, describing the political 
system as ‘tout un écosystème’ which should not be too greatly disturbed. This may appear 
sensible, but is a long way from the rejection of the very mechanisms of the modern state 
implicit in a community of friendship; Agamben holds that ‘[t]he novelty of the coming 
politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest or control of the State, but a 
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struggle between the State and the non-State’. Chaouch represents the former rather than the 
latter (Louatah 2016, 232-233; Agamben 1993, 85-86). 
That control of the mechanisms of the state as it is now cannot be enough to realise 
Chaouch’s utopian vision is suggested by the fact that he only defeats Montesquiou by 
compromising on his wish to end the manipulation of the electorate through the media. 
Although he knows that Nazir probably organised the Saint-Étienne massacre Chaouch 
makes a deal with him, allowing him to remain free in return for evidence incriminating 
Montesquiou; he will never face trial for his crimes and the public will never know, seeing 
only Montesquiou being brought to justice. The progress that Chaouch represents can 
paradoxically only be made by manipulating public opinion using similar tactics to those of 
his opponents in order to bring them down; this demonstrates the difficulty of avoiding the 
use of such tactics in a modern democracy.  
The most high-profile conspirator arrested, meanwhile, is Montesquiou, when the 
conspiracy went at least as high as Vermorel. The nation may be temporarily united, but the 
most influential of those who seek to divide it remain in their positions of influence; while the 
public is not inherently racist, it has demonstrated its susceptibility to their manipulations 
(Louatah 2016, 62-63, 69-70, 288-290 293-294, 296-297). That Chaouch’s success is so 
partial and fragile, and can only be achieved by using the same tactics that he hoped to 
consign to history, seems to urge still more mistrust of the modern state: no homme 
providentiel working within it, Les Sauvages implies, can escape the need to use these 
strategies. 
The uncertainty of the apparent national unity which emerges in Les Sauvages is 
visible in the experiences of the protagonists. When she takes part in a march 
commemorating those who died in Saint-Étienne Luna is still wearing her veil. This article 
does not intend to suggest that a young girl choosing to wear a veil should be considered 
problematic; Luna, however, adopted hers as a reaction to her exclusion. That she is still 
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wearing it even after the Nerrouche family name has been cleared implies that France’s racial 
and religious divisions are too deeply rooted to be overcome in the short term. Krim and 
Aurélie’s relationship may seem more promising, but transpires to have its roots in Nazir’s 
schemes: before the two met he had offered Aurélie free drugs if she would pretend to find 
Krim attractive, hoping that the discovery of her betrayal would increase Krim’s resentment 
for bourgeois France and thus make him more likely to carry out the attack on Chaouch. 
While the genuine feelings that they develop for one another despite Nazir suggest that racial 
and social divisions can be overcome, that outside manipulation is required in order for their 
relationship to be possible underlines how entrenched those divisions are (Louatah 2016, 
209-211, 315-316, 320-321). 
If Les Sauvages urges its readers to strive to bridge divides imposed from above by 
political ‘elites’, then, it is under no illusion that doing so will be easy. Any attempt to 
appropriate the structures of contemporary democracy to this end, the text suggests, must 
inevitably require a certain deception of the electorate. By retaining a division between the 
‘elite’ and those whom they manipulate, it will therefore undermine any apparent progress 
that it makes towards national unity. Two readings of Les Sauvages seem possible in this 
context. One could argue that it implies that communities of friendship cannot be formed 
while working within modern democracies: that readers should reject traditional political 
engagement, instead seeking to bridge racial and religious divides in ways which repudiate 
state control. Alternatively, one could propose the less radical reading that political action like 
that of Chaouch will be necessary if a more united society is ever to be constructed but that it 
cannot be sufficient on its own: that Chaouch’s democratic progressivism and the anti-state 
radicality of com-parution are both vital. Their differing interpretations of the legitimacy of 
traditional political engagement notwithstanding, both readings agree on two points. Firstly, 
as Hajjat and Mohammed argue, racial and religious divisions are being imposed upon 
French society from above by self-interested political and media elites. Secondly, if those 
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divisions are to be overturned then the structures of modern democracy cannot on their own 
enable this to happen. What Chaouch calls ‘[les] gens de bonne volonté’ must strive to form a 
community of friendship that rejects the exclusion inherent in the modern state (Louatah 
2016, 51-53). Its insistence on the role of elites in imposing divisions in modern societies, 
and suggestion that something more radical than mainstream politics alone is needed in order 
to overcome this, are among the key points which emerge from Les Sauvages. 
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i The racist abuse to which grieving family members of victims of the 2016 Nice terrorist attack were subjected 
at public commemoration services is a particularly shocking real-life example of this (Charrihi & Brunet 2017, 
27, 46-50). 
ii I do not mean to suggest that all French Muslim women who wear veils do so for this reason, but it seems to 
be Luna’s primary motivation. Caitlin Killian (2003, 579) pinpoints similar reactions from young women who 
have remained subject to racism after conforming to the expectations of the dominant group as one of the 
multitude of reasons why young French women choose to wear the veil. 
                                                          
